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Abstract—Currently, Android malware detection is mostly
performed on the server side against the increasing number of
malware. Powerful computing resource provides more exhaustive
protection for app markets than maintaining detection by a single
user. However, apart from the applications (apps) provided by
the official market (i.e., Google Play Store), apps from unofficial
markets and third-party resources are always causing serious
security threats to end-users. Meanwhile, it is a time-consuming
task if the app is downloaded first and then uploaded to the
server side for detection, because the network transmission has
a lot of overhead. In addition, the uploading process also suffers
from the threat of attackers. Consequently, a last line of defense
on mobile devices is necessary and much-needed.
In this paper, we propose an effective Android malware
detection system, MobiTive, leveraging customized deep neural
networks to provide a real-time and responsive detection envi-
ronment on mobile devices. MobiTive is a pre-installed solution
rather than an app scanning and monitoring engine using after
installation, which is more practical and secure. Although a
deep learning-based approach can be maintained on server side
efficiently for malware detection, original deep learning models
cannot be directly deployed and executed on mobile devices due
to various performance limitations, such as computation power,
memory size, and energy. Therefore, we evaluate and investigate
the following key points: (1) the performance of different feature
extraction methods based on source code or binary code; (2) the
performance of different feature type selections for deep learning
on mobile devices; (3) the detection accuracy of different deep
neural networks on mobile devices; (4) the real-time detection
performance and accuracy on different mobile devices; (5)
the potential based on the evolution trend of mobile devices’
specifications; and finally we further propose a practical solution
(MobiTive) to detect Android malware on mobile devices.
Index Terms—Android malware, Malware detection, Deep
neural network, Mobile platform, Performance
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the currently increasing number of Android de-vices and applications (apps), plenty of Android users
are benefited from that. The security and privacy concerns are
also increasingly becoming the focus point to various mobile
users and stakeholders. For example, more and more users
store their personal data in mobile devices through various
popular apps such as shopping, banking, and social apps. Con-
sequently, since the last decade, attackers shift their attention
to mobile apps. That makes Android malware undoubtedly
become one of the most important security threats in this
security field [1], [2].
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Therefore, how to detect Android malware becomes a
severe problem. End-users always expect a secure environment
which is maintained by the app markets. In other words, they
consider their app sources are all trustable and secure enough.
It is not surprising that the demands of Android malware
detection approaches have been proposed, such as signature-
based approaches [3]–[5], behavior-based approaches [6]–[9],
data-flow analysis-based approaches [10]–[12]. We note that
machine learning-based approach [13]–[18] is one of the
most promising techniques in detecting Android malware.
With the available big data and hardware evolution over the
past decade, deep learning has achieved tremendous success
in many cutting-edge domains, including Android malware
detection. Actually, all of the above protecting solutions are
mostly on server side for app markets. However, when a new
Android malware family is reported, not all the app markets
are able to respond in a responsive time. The current analysis
workflow always follows analyzing malicious behaviors within
apps, building the detection models with the generated features
and then performing the detection on the entire apps. Since
the number of the real-world Android apps is extremely
large, e.g., there are more than 3 million Android apps on
Google Play Store, it is a time-consuming task to perform the
complete detection with that large number of apps. Moreover,
the apps from unofficial markets and third-party resources like
XDA [19] are more vulnerable in the wild. The security of
these kinds of apps is indeed unpredictable and uncontrollable.
The traditional server-side based malware detection surely
has unignorable drawbacks when detecting such apps, because
(1) it is a time-consuming task to upload the apps to server
before the installation, especially for large apps; (2) the
uploading process via the Internet is not secure. For example,
attackers may modify the malware during the uploading period
such that an incorrect “benign” result is returned. As a result,
the users will install the malware. Hence, a last line of defense
on mobile devices is necessary and much-needed. To address
the severe problem, we intend to conduct Android malware
detection on mobile devices instead of server side.
Actually, machine learning-based approaches have achieved
better performance compared with other approaches in An-
droid malware detection [13], [15], [17], [20]. In this paper,
we intend to deploy the trained deep learning (DL) models
from server-side to mobile devices. While a computationally
intensive deep learning software could be executed efficiently
on server-side with the GPU support, such deep learning
models usually cannot be directly deployed and executed on
other platforms supported by small mobile devices due to var-
ious computation resource limitations such as the computation
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2power, memory size, and energy. In our previous work [21],
we leverage TensorFlow Lite [22] for Android to migrate the
deep learning models. We proposed a convolutional neural
network (CNN)-based Android malware detection system on
mobile platform, which leveraged three kinds of features from
decompiled Android apps according to the performance-based
feature selection mechanism. In this journal version, we have
substantially extended our previous work from the following
aspects:
• In the conference version [21], we only focused on the
performance of different feature types extracted from
decompiled files such as smali files. To reach the best
performance on mobile devices, we take the installation
mechanism in the Android operation system into account.
Specifically, we analyze and extract two types of features
(i.e., manifest properties and API calls) from Dalvik
binary files directly instead of the decompiled files.
• Meanwhile, to enrich the malicious behavior coverage of
our selected features, we perform an empirical analysis
to understand the existing malicious behaviors, most of
which are collected from industrial malware analysis
reports (e.g., Symantec Threats [23]). According to the
understanding, we further update the feature inputs with
the matching results between text-based behavior descrip-
tions and code level features (details on our website [24]).
• To figure out the potential detection accuracy promotion
of different deep neural networks, we not only apply our
new extracted features with CNN models, but also present
six more kinds of recurrent neural networks models (e.g.,
LSTM and GRU). Finally, we customized one RNN
model to adopt the device-based detection scenario.
• To peek into the average usability and best practice
for our new system, we evaluate our system on six
real mobile devices from different manufacturers such as
Google, Huawei, and Samsung, which released between
2015 and 2019. We also investigate the development
trend of Android mobile phones to further understand
the system usability.
According to the evaluation metrics of accuracy and time
cost from different features and neural networks, we propose
an effective and efficient Android malware detection system
on mobile devices, named MobiTive. MobiTive leverages (1)
a newly-proposed feature extraction method from binary code;
(2) a performance-based feature type selection mechanism; (3)
a novel feature updating method through malicious behavior
mining and understanding; (4) a customized deep neural
network for classification. So that, MobiTive can provide a
real-time and fast responsive environment on mobile devices.
In our comprehensive experiments, (1) we first divide
the feature preparation procedure into two steps, which are
raw data extraction and feature extraction, and evaluate the
performance (time cost) separately to decide the feature se-
lection. (2) With the selected features, we then provide an
accuracy comparison between different feature categories. (3)
The behavior-based feature updating method performs around
1%∼5% accuracy increase. (4) We provide a comprehensive
comparison between seven different neural networks (e.g.,
CNN, LSTM, and GRU) to show the potential improvement
of our customized DL models on network definition. (5) We
further evaluate the performance and accuracy of MobiTive on
different real mobile devices by using our customized RNN
model. (6) In the last part of our experiments, we perform an
analysis of the performance trend on mobile devices from three
different aspects and integrate the results to provide a strong
evidence on the potential of MobiTive in practice. Specifically,
MobiTive achieves a relatively higher classification accuracy
(i.e., 96.78% accuracy) on real testing data in the wild and
mobile devices with relatively lower overhead (i.e., less than
3 seconds on average for one app).
In summary, we make the following main contributions.
• We propose MobiTive, a device-end solution to protect
mobile devices from malware threats in real-time effi-
ciently by leveraging customized deep neural networks
and binary features. This research work aims to detect
malware directly on mobile devices as a pre-installed
solution rather than detecting them on common servers
or monitoring them after installation.
• We propose a new feature extraction method from binary
code, as well as a feature updating method based on the
understanding of malicious behaviors. Due to high per-
formance demand of mobile devices, we further evaluate
the different performance (time cost) and accuracy with
various feature types and neural networks.
• We evaluate and investigate the different performance on
multiple devices from different manufacturers, and further
provide insights of the current quality and potential for
our approach according to the feature extraction and
prediction time cost on six real mobile devices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces the background of this work, Section III details our
proposed approach to detect Android malware. We conduct our
experiments in Section IV. Section V discusses the limitations
of MobiTive. We list the related work in Section VI. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce the structure of An-
droid apps and Dalvik executable, the existing Android secu-
rity mechanisms, and the migration/quantization procedure of
trained DL models on PC/Server side.
A. Android Apps
To execute the code of Android apps, Android developers
compile their source code and other components, like applica-
tion structure files and other resources, etc., into an Android
application package (APK). APK is a compressed application
file for Android platform, which is used to deliver Android
mobile applications. For each APK, it contains a manifest file
(i.e., AndroidManifest.xml), Dex files, resources, assets, and
certificates.
The manifest file contains the meta-data for Android apps,
which defines the package name and application ID, app
components like Intent filters, activities, and services, etc., per-
missions, device compatibility, like uses-feature and uses-sdk,
3etc. Dex files as extension are Dalvik executable code, which
can be executed on Dalvik virtual machine in Android OS and
converted from Java bytecode via an alternative instruction set.
To make them more accessible, Dex files are often decompiled
into smali files by reverse engineering, which contain the
same meaning contents, but have a better syntax format before
manual analysis. However, the decompiling procedure, which
decompiles Dex into smali/source code, will always cost
considerable time.
B. Dalvik Executable
Dalvik executable file contains 21 kinds of contents, which
can be mainly divided into metadata and program information,
etc. The metadata information of Dalvik executable file is
provided by the header, checksum, signature, etc. After them,
it follows with the size and offset values of program informa-
tion, like class definition identifiers, method identifiers, type
identifiers, string identifiers, etc. Besides the above program
information, the map offset is also an important component.
It provides concrete mappings between static information, like
strings and method names, etc. With the given offsets, we can
easily access the defined static program information without
decompiling the binary executable into human readable for-
mat. Other than the static information, we can also get the
compiled code contents with the offset of each method in
different classes.
C. Security Mechanisms
The existing security mechanisms can be mainly divided
into two categories, which are application market and Android
OS platform aspects in practice.
From the aspect of Android market, the official market
(i.e., Google Play Store) provides a security verification when
the APK uploaded. For instance, Google provides protec-
tion backed by its machine learning algorithm. Some high-
quality third-party markets also present security check for
the uploaded applications. For example, ApkMirror [25] not
only provides the signature verification, but also performs a
protection service provided by GuardSquare. However, most of
current security check service provided by third-party markets
is very simple and limited. Some of them only contain a sig-
nature verification, which can be bypassed easily. Therefore,
the users, who download applications from the third-party
markets, have to install and use it at their own security risk.
On the mobile devices, there exists a lot of antivirus
applications provided. The most famous applications, like
Avast and Kaspersky, mainly provide their antivirus services
by monitoring the privacy-sensitive components on the device
and an application scanning with their on-cloud virus database.
Besides the protection from outside, Android OS also pro-
vides some strong built-in security mechanisms, like applica-
tion sandbox, etc. Application sandbox mechanism provides
an independent execution environment for every application.
Hence, the attack from an application can only work on
its own requested components. For instance, if Bluetooth
permissions and actions liked activities are not required in the
application, the attack can never access the functions provided
by Bluetooth.
D. Deep Learning Model Migration and Quantization
After a DL model finishes the training process and is ready
to deploy to a target device, it oftentime goes through either
quantization, or platform migration, or both, before deployed
to end-user applications. This is because the training phase
requires a vast amount of computation and energy resources.
As the model size and the complexity of the tasks grow, more
data are needed to train the network till reaching optimality,
which could spend days, if not weeks, in training on high-
performance GPU clusters. On the other hand, the deployment
of the DNN models is usually faced with the resource-
constrained environment with limited computation, storage,
and power.
Due to environment differences of a target platform (e.g.,
mobile phones, green energy embedded systems) and training
platform (e.g., often equipped with GPUs), a DL model often
goes through a customization phase to cater specific software
and hardware constraints of a target platform. Quantization
reduces the precision of a DL model so as to improve
the computation efficiency, reduce memory consumption and
storage size, which has become a common practice when
migrating a large DL model trained on the cloud system to
a mobile or IoT devices with low computation power.
Recently, the rapid development of system-on-chip (SoC)
acceleration (e.g., Qualcomm Snapdragon, Kirin 970, Sam-
sung Exynos9) for AI applications provides the hardware sup-
port and foundation for universal deployment across platforms,
especially on mobile device, edge computing device and so
forth. Some lightweight solutions are proposed for mobile
platforms such as CoreML [26], TensorFlow Lite [22], Caffe2
Mobile [27] and PyTorch Android [28]. It proposes a chance
to deploy the DL-based malware detection task on a mobile
device directly.
III. APPROACH
In this section, we first introduce the overview of our
approach (named MobiTive), and then detail each of the key
phases.
A. Overview of MobiTive
To achieve our target, we propose MobiTive, whose func-
tionality could be divided into two main parts (i.e., parts of
server side and mobile side), as shown in Fig. 1. The first
part of our system contains feature preparation, DL model
training, model migration and quantization. The second part
is the deployment phase on mobile devices by using the
migrated/quantized models.
In our previous work [21], we involved multiple features
(i.e., manifest properties, API calls, and opcode sequences)
extracted from decompiled apps. In this paper, to improve
the performance of MobiTive, we propose a new feature
extraction method. Instead of decompiling APK into source
code, like smali code, we extract and vectorize the manifest
properties and API calls from binary code directly (step 1©).
We combine a performance-based feature selection mechanism
and behavior-based feature updating method to generate the
feature dictionary (step 2©). With the customized deep neural
4Fig. 1. Overview of MobiTive
networks and extracted feature vectors (steps 3© and 4©), the
first part allows to provide a trained DL model and a feature
dictionary for the second part (step 5©). To make the model
adaptive to mobile devices, we then migrate the pre-built
DL model to a TensorFlow Lite model. Also, a quantization
phase [29], which is a general technique to reduce model size
while also providing lower latency with little degradation in
accuracy, is presented as a performance optimization for the
mobile devices (step 6©).
Fig. 1 shows that the second part loads the quantized DL
model and feature dictionary into mobile devices. After that,
when an application is downloaded from market or third-
party market, MobiTive can extract feature vectors from it and
deliver the result to MobiTive (steps A©→ C©). After predicting
with the loaded DL model, we obtain a certain level of
confidence based on predictive output to know whether the
downloaded Android app is a malware or not. (steps D©→ E©).
B. Feature Preparation
To determine the features used in MobiTive, we perform a
comparison of the extracting performance for most commonly-
used features in previous malware detection approaches [13],
[15], [17], [30], [31]. Based on the performance-based feature
selection method, manifest properties and API calls are se-
lected in our device-end scenario (Feature Selection). Also, to
update the feature dictionary and improve the representatives,
we propose a behavior-based method based on industrial
malware reports (Feature Updating). To get the features from
the APK, we first unzip the package instead of decompiling
it to reduce time cost. Among the unzipped binary files, we
can extract the two feature types from the raw data (Feature
Extraction).
1) Feature Selection: Manifest properties such as used
permissions, intents, and hardware features are widely-used
features to detect Android malware [13], [15], [17]. An-
droidManifest.xml file can be easily decoded from APK file
through existing tools, which benefits the feature extraction
procedure. It is belonging to a lightweight feature type, which
would be adopted by the performance-sensitive system, like
MobiTive. In terms of the usefulness, API calls are more
representative and important feature types because almost all
TABLE I
SELECTED FEATURES. FEATURE LISTS CAN BE FOUND ON [24].
#API calls #Manifest properties
Collected from samples or
by Android documentation 2,989,011 613
Pruning by manual 1,509 613
Updated by
behavior-based analysis 2,290 625
malicious behaviors would be demonstrated by API callings.
Apart from the individual API call, API call sequence may
contains more semantics, such as opcode code sequence.
However, the extraction procedure of these two feature types
causes a lot of time due to analyzing source code or smali
code. A novel feature extraction method for API calls is much-
needed due to the energy limitation of mobile devices. Besides
the above two widely-used feature types, we also evaluate
other potential structural features by their performance be-
haviors, such as inter-procedural control-flow graph (ICFG)
and call graph (CG). ICFG not only provides the control-
flow graph but also contains the inter-procedural between the
components within apps. CG represents the calling relations
between different methods. By evaluating the performance
(time cost) of all these potential feature types based on the
two different extraction steps, which are raw data and feature
vector extraction (steps 1© and 3©), we select unzipping APK
to extract raw data first and select API calls and manifest
properties as our feature types due to the better extraction
performance compared with others (details in § IV-B).
To get the feature vectors (step 3©), we build a feature
dictionary (step 2©) according to the two types of features
selected by performance comparison. Specifically, we build the
manifest property dictionary by following the official Android
documentation. As shown in Table I, the manifest properties
contain 613 features in total, including 324 used permissions,
213 intents, and 76 hardware features. In terms of the API call
dictionary, we conduct a data-driven analysis to determine the
feature lists. Specifically, by parsing the API calls from more
than 60k real-world Android apps collected from Google Play
Store and malware, we collect 2,989,011 unique API calls in
5total. We summarize three rules to reduce the size of API calls
through manual analysis. Firstly, we remove the obfuscated
API calls. Secondly, we delete the API calls that are not related
to potential malicious behaviors, such as View loading API.
Last, we remove the third-party API calls, because these API
calls exist and customize in an app, may rarely appear in
other apps. As shown in Table I, after pruning, the number
of selected API calls is only 1,509. The details of feature lists
can be found on our website [24]. We build a feature dictionary
based on the 1,509 API calls and 613 manifest properties for
matching on the features of permission, intent, hardware, and
API call (step 2©).
2) Feature Updating: The quality of machine learning-
based detection approaches highly depends on the selected
features, which means that a more comprehensive feature cov-
erage of malicious behaviors makes more benefits MobiTive.
To enrich the feature coverage of malicious behaviors, we
collect hundreds of industrial malware reports from Symantec
Threats [23]. With the collected text-based reports, we perform
a manual analysis and summarize 23 kinds of basic potential
malicious behaviors as a supplement for the selected features.
Note that, the malware reports detail the malicious behaviors
and the core code level features, including both API calls
and manifest properties. Also, a behavior-based feature under-
standing and verification by three co-authors are performed
to ensure the manual results. As a result, except the features
in the original feature dictionary, there are 46 new API calls
and 12 new manifest properties in total, which are updated for
a new feature dictionary. We also extend the new API calls
with their package name. For example, if a new API call has
package name as “android/net/Uri”, we extract all the API
calls under this package. As shown in Table I, there are 781
API calls extended according to the 46 new API calls. Finally,
we supplement our feature dictionary and update to 2,290 API
calls and 625 manifest properties. The new feature dictionary
is used to get the feature vector of each app for model training.
3) Feature Vector Extraction: As we mentioned in feature
selection, the traditional feature vector extraction methods
cause a lot of time due to the cost of decompiling and
extracting from source code such as Java code and smali code.
To improve the extraction performance, we propose a novel
feature vector extraction method from binary code instead of
source code. Specifically, by analyzing the inner architecture
of Dalvik binary file (classes.dex), we find there exists an API
table, which is used to match the executable symbols and
API strings. We extract API calls by parsing the API table
in classes.dex file based on the address and offset defined in
the metadata. Meanwhile, to get access to the information
in binary format AndroidManifest.xml, we firstly generate
a standard output with a XML decoder, Axmldec [32]. By
analyzing the decoded manifest file, the manifest properties
can be extracted.
C. DL Model Construction
1) DL Model Training: To discover the potential accuracy
improvement and usability for different deep neural networks,
TABLE II
DEEP NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURE: GRU AND LSTM
Input
Reshape input (None, 2915, )output (None, 1, 2915)
GRU/LSTM input (None, 1, 2915)output (None, 128)
Dropout
Softmax Classification
TABLE III
DEEP NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURE: STACKED GRU AND LSTM
Input
Reshape input (None, 2915, )output (None, 1, 2915)
GRU/LSTM input (None, 1, 2915)output (None, 1, 128)
Dropout
GRU/LSTM input (None, 1, 128)output (None, 128)
Dropout
Softmax Classification
we present seven widely-used networks to train the classifier,
with the generated input feature vectors generated by step 3©.
As shown in Table II, III and IV, we customize the RNN
models to adopt the device-end scenario and improve perfor-
mance. For simple RNNs in Table II, the first computational
layer is a LSTM/GRU layer with 128 neural units. After the
computation, the dimension of input tensor will reduce to
128 from (1, 2,915). Then, there will be a dropout layer, the
dropout rate is 0.5. At last, the result is passed to a softmax
classifier function to get the final training result. For stacked
RNNs in Table III, there will two stacked LSTM/GRU with
dropout layers instead. For bidirectional RNNs in Table IV, we
apply a bidirectional LSTM/GRU layer instead of the original
LSTM/GRU layer.
Additionally, we build the convolutional neural network
(CNN) with reference to the conference version [21]. As
shown in Table V, the first layer of the CNN model is Zero
Padding Layer. With input feature vectors, we need to fit it to
the the training part. Hence, we add two nonsense dimensions
to the end of input since the kernel size of our convolutional
layer is 3. Then, the resulting vector is reshaped to a matrix,
whose horizontal dimension is 3, and send to the next layer.
The second layer is the convolution layer with a 3 kernel,
which receives the embedded matrix as its input and applies
the convolution filter to produce activation maps for each
batch. Before delivering the batches to the hidden layer, a
global max pooling is used after activation to reduce the
dimensions. Finally, the vector is passed to a hidden full layer,
which is a multi-layer perception, for classification. To detect
the relation between the result vector, we construct two sub-
layers in the hidden layer, each of them contains a Rectified
Linear Unit activation function. At last, the result from the
hidden layer is passed to a softmax classifier function to get
the final training result.
2) DL Model Migration and Quantization: To deploy our
pre-trained DL model on mobile devices, we convert and
migrate the pre-trained model to a TensorFlow-lite model,
6TABLE IV
DEEP NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURE: BIDIRECTIONAL GRU AND
LSTM
Input
Reshape input (None, 2915, )output (None, 1, 2915)
Bidirectional (GRU/LSTM) input (None, 1, 2915)output (None, 256)
Dropout
Softmax Classification
TABLE V
DEEP NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURE: CNN
Input
Reshape input (None, 2915, )output (None, 1, 2915)
Zero Padding Layer input (None, 1, 2915)output (None, 1, 2916)
Reshape input (None, 1, 2916)output (None, 3, 708)
Convolutional Layer input (None, 3, 708)output (None, 64, 706)
Relu
Global Max Pooling input (None, 64, 706)output (None, 64)
Linear Dense Layer input (None, 64)output (None, 16)
Relu
Linear Dense Layer input (None, 16)output (None, 2)
Softmax Classification
which is supported by Android operating system (step 6©).
Specifically, we migrate the TensorFlow model to a mobile
readable TensorFlow Lite model with a TensorFlow-lite con-
verter [22]. Apart from the model migration, we also quantize
our pre-trained model to improve the performance on mobile
devices, which does not affect the accuracy of detection much.
In the experiments, we measure the performance of accuracy
and time cost affected by the model migration and quantization
(details in §IV-C3).
D. Real-time Detection System (MobiTive)
Before conducting a real-time detection, the quantized Ten-
sorFlow Lite model and feature dictionary should be deployed
to the detection system in advance (step 8©). There are three
main steps before completing the prediction. The first step
of MobiTive is feature preparation. When an APK file is
received in step A©, MobiTive first unzips it into original
assembly files such as AndroidManifest.xml, classes.dex, and
other resources. Features of API calls and manifest properties
will be extracted accordingly. We implement an API parser to
extract the API calls from classes.dex directly based on the
understanding of Dalvik binary code. Since the raw binary
AndroidManifest.xml cannot be analyzed directly, we use a
third-party decoder library, AXML [33], to get the decoded
manifest file. By analyzing the decoded manifest file, the three
kinds of manifest properties will be extracted from the XML
tag. Hence, we can get both the manifest property vector and
API call vector in step B©. All the two types of features are
transformed into a feature vector, we connect them together
as the input of TensorFlow-lite model (step C©). With the
quantized model, MobiTive can perform the prediction in step
D© and show the final prediction result as a feedback in step
E©.
To deploy an update for the MobiTive in practice, the ser-
vice provider firstly need to collect the new detected malware
and update the training dataset. After the dataset updated, it
will be able to obtain a new pre-trained model on the server.
Then, the new model can be packed as a system patch and
deployed to devices within an update directly. As a result,
MobiTive with the updated model should be able to find more
similar malware, which surely will benefit the effectiveness
and robustness of the detection model by uploading them back
to the service provider.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, the goals of our experiments are to in-
vestigate: (1) the performance of extraction time of different
raw data types; (2) the performance of extraction time of
different feature types (manifest properties, API calls, and
opcode sequences, etc.); (3) the usefulness of behavior-based
feature updating method; (4) the detection accuracy of differ-
ent neural networks; (5) the usability of MobiTive on different
real mobile devices; (6) the hardware performance trend of
Android mobile devices.
A. Used Dataset and Experiment Environment
Used Dataset. As shown in Table VI, we collect more than 70k
Android apps in total as our evaluation subject. Specifically,
these apps consist of 29,010 Android malware, and others are
benign apps crawled from Google Play Store. However, these
might be malware on the official market. To filter the potential
malware as far as possible, we upload them to VirusTotal [34],
which is an online antivirus service with over 60 security
scanners, to make a verification. The 29,010 malicious samples
contain 5,560 apps that downloaded from Drebin [13], 1,260
apps validated in Genome project [1], 20,000 crawled from
VirusShare, and the remaining are used in KuafuDet [17],
including 360 from Contagio Mobile Website [35] and 1,830
from Pwnzen Infotech Inc. [36]. In summary, we collect a
large-scale dataset of benign and malicious samples for the
following experiments. Since our dataset comes from multiple
sources, there have a lot of duplicated samples. Therefore, we
perform a hash check for eliminating redundant apps among
malicious and benign apps. During the data prepossessing,
which has raw data decompiling and feature vector generation
steps, we receive some failed cases due to the capabilities
of API parser. While the rest of the failures are just caused
by broken APK packages, we also remove them directly. As a
result, we choose 18,000 benign and malicious samples respec-
tively from our dataset to conduct the following experiments.
In training stage, we divide these 18,000 malware and 18,000
benign apps into three parts, 80% of them are configured as
training data, other 20% are equally split into validating and
testing data.
Experiment environment. The experiments on server side are
run on a Ubuntu 16.04 server with two Intel Xeon E5-2699
V3 CPUs, 192GB RAM, and NVIDIA GeForce 2080Ti GPU.
7TABLE VI
USED DATASET
Datasets Labels Original Size Deduplicated Size
Drebin Malware 5,560 3,561
Genome Malware 1,260 1,009
Contagio Malware 360 198
Pwnzen Malware 1,830 572
VirusShare Malware 20,000 12,660
Total Malware 29,010 18,000
Total Benign 45,284 18,000
To evaluate our approach, we select six different Android
mobile devices to evaluate the performance and accuracy of
our approach on real mobile devices. Among them, there are
four common specification devices (Nexus 6P, Huawei Mate
10, HTC U11, and LG G6), a flagship device (Huawei P30),
and a low-profile device (Samsung Galaxy J7 Pro) (detailed
specifications provided on our website [24]). The implemen-
tation language of our system on server is Python 3. To get
access to the raw data and features, we use seven different
kinds of existing tools, which are axmldec [32], AXML [33],
ApkTool [37], AndroGuard [38], Dex2jar [39], Soot [40], and
FlowDroid [10]. axmldec is a C++ project which can be used
to decode binary manifest file into readable XML format file.
AXML is a library designed to parse binary Android XML
files. It is written in Java and can be used in an Android
app as an external library. ApkTool is a tool for reverse
engineering, which can decompile the apk file and generate
the resources, which contains manifest, smali files, and etc.
AndroGuard is a Python tool, which cannot only decode the
resources but also disassemble bytecode to Java code. Also,
with the help of AndroGuard, we can easily generate the call
graphs (CG) and data-flow graph for an Android app. Dex2jar
is a project which contains tools to work with Android .dex
and Java .class files. Soot is a Java optimization framework,
which can be used to extract the call graph (CG). FlowDroid
is a static taint analysis tool for Android apps. It is applied
to generate inter-procedural control-flow graph (ICFG). Apart
from the above existing tools for feature extraction, JitPack
is a novel package repository for JVM and Android projects,
which can build the project to a ready-to-use artifacts (i.e., jar
and aar). The deep neural networks and training projects are
implemented with Keras [41], Numpy [42], Scikit-learn [43],
and TensorFlow [44] libraries.
B. Effectiveness of Feature Selection, Feature Extraction, and
Neural Networks
In this section, we evaluate (1) the performance of extraction
time of different raw data types based on different tools we
introduced above; (2) the performance of extraction time of
different feature types (e.g., manifest properties, API calls, and
opcode sequence); (3) the effectiveness of the behavior-based
feature updating method; and (4) the accuracy performance of
different deep neural networks.
1) Performance comparison of raw data extraction: In this
experiment, we evaluate the extraction time of 4 different raw
data types (i.e., ICFG extracted by FlowDroid, CG extracted
Fig. 2. Extraction time of different raw data types
Fig. 3. Extraction time of different feature types
by Soot and AndroGuard, decompiled files obtained by Ap-
kTool, and binary code obtained by unzipping). For different
extracting methods, we evaluate them on different sizes of
apps from 5MB to 50MB. Each size contains 10 apps.
Fig. 2 shows the extraction time of ICFG and CG is too large
to be accepted performance-sensitive approach like MobiTive.
Specifically, extracting ICG via FlowDroid takes 196.868
seconds on 50MB apps and even 17.963 seconds on 5MB
apps on average. Generating CG with Soot takes 126 seconds
on 50MB apps and 57 seconds on 5MB apps, and it costs
32.13 seconds and 3.498 seconds accordingly when prepared
with AndroGuard. AndroGuard achieves a better performance
than Soot on CG extraction. As for MobiTive, the detection
should be performed in a responsive period comparing to
the app installing time, users cannot buy it if the reacting
time takes too long. The extraction time costs of decompiling,
which applied in our previous work [21], is acceptable but
also limited, by comparing with the app installing time on
average. Considering the time cost of extracting raw data by
unzipping, 5MB apps take only 0.037 seconds and 50MB apps
take 0.594 seconds, which reaches a much better performance
than the processing time of decompiling. Therefore, we decide
to use unzipping as our raw data extraction method.
2) Performance comparison of feature extraction: Apart
from the above raw data extracting method, we further eval-
uate the extracting performance of 3 different feature types
(i.e., manifest properties, API calls, and opcode sequence)
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DETECTION RESULTS OF FEATURE UPDATING
Feature Dictionary Size Networks Precision Recall Accuracy
1509 API + 613 Manifest CNN 90.03% 91.00% 89.26%
2290 API + 625 Mniafest CNN 95.11% 95.06% 95.16%
1509 API + 613 Manifest LSTM 95.44% 95.56% 95.34%
2290 API + 625 Mniafest LSTM 96.56% 96.72% 96.40%
1509 API + 613 Manifest GRU 95.56% 95.22% 95.86%
2290 API + 625 Mniafest GRU 96.75% 96.78% 96.72%
generated from two kinds of raw data types (i.e., decompiling
and unzipping). We do not further evaluate the graph-related
features due to the large time cost of raw data extracting.
We use a XML tag parser to extract manifest properties from
manifest file decompiled by ApkTool. To extract API calls,
we obtain the result by matching the API call dictionary and
smali files directly. We extract the opcode sequences for each
smali file by matching it to the opcode list [45].
For the unzipped binary manifest and Dalvik binary files,
we evaluate the extraction time of 2 different feature types
(i.e., manifest properties and API calls). To extract manifest
properties from the binary manifest file, we apply Axmldec to
extract manifest properties. We extract API calls by loading
the API table directly with the offset and size defined in the
metadata of the Dalvik binary file.
Fig. 3 shows that the time consumption of features extracted
from decompiled files is much longer than the same features
generated directly from unzipped binary files. Specifically, in
terms of the time cost of API calls, extracting them from 5MB
apps only takes only 0.042 seconds on average. However, if
we extract the API calls from decompiled smali files, it takes
2.923 seconds. For the 50MB apps, it will cost 0.601 and
5.002 seconds for extracting the API calls. Considering the
extraction time of manifest properties, 5MB and 50MB apps
will take 2.89 and 4.841 seconds, when we extract the manifest
properties from the decoded manifest file by ApkTool. When
we extract them from the unzipped binary manifest file, the
time is reduced to 0.041 and 0.599. Apart from manifest
properties and API calls, we find that the extraction time of
opcode sequence is much larger than the other two feature
types. For 50MB apps, it will take over 6 seconds on average.
Therefore, to improve the performance of MobiTive in feature
extraction, we decide to use the two feature types with shorter
extraction time as our model inputs.
3) Accuracy comparison of behavior-based feature updat-
ing method: To evaluate the effectiveness of the behavior-
based feature updating method presented in Section III-B2, we
conduct a comparison experiment between the features used
in our previous work [21] (1,509 API calls and 613 manifest
properties) and the updated version in Table I (2,290 API calls
and 625 manifest properties). For each feature version, we
apply three kinds of deep neural networks, which presented
in Section III-C1, to investigate whether the feature updating
method can improve the accuracy of our detection system. In
Table VII, the accuracy of updated feature version on CNN,
LSTM and GRU is 95.11%, 96.56% and 96.75%. Comparing
to the previous results, there is around 1%∼5% improvement
after feature updating. Therefore, based on the result, we
accept updating features summarised from potential malicious
TABLE VIII
DETECTION RESULTS OF FEATURE CATEGORIES AND NETWORKS ON
SERVER SIDE
Categories Neural Networks Precision Recall Accuracy
Manifest CNN 79.89% 79.50% 80.12%
API Calls CNN 93.17% 92.33% 93.90%
Two Types CNN 95.11% 95.06% 95.16%
Two Types LSTM 96.56% 96.72% 96.40%
Two Types GRU 96.75% 96.78% 96.72%
Two Types Stacked LSTM 96.64% 96.83% 96.46%
Two Types Stacked GRU 96.67% 97.00% 96.36%
Two Types Bidirectional LSTM 96.61% 96.67% 96.56%
Two Types Bidirectional GRU 96.78% 97.00% 96.57%
behaviors a part of our input features.
4) Accuracy comparison of feature categories and deep
neural networks: To find out the correlation between selected
features, we demonstrate two newly-updated feature categories
(Table I) to investigate their corresponding accuracy. Conse-
quently, we train five DL models using three neural networks
with both single feature type and combined two feature types,
to provide insights for the feature category selection. As shown
in Table VIII, the accuracy of the three CNN models is
79.89%, 93.17% and 95.11%. By comparing the accuracy of
feature categories, we decide to use manifest properties and
API calls together as an input bundle in our approach since
the input with two feature types has the best result.
To determine the best deep neural network, we evaluate
seven widely-used neural networks by using the combined
two feature categories. As shown in Table VIII, in general,
RNN models perform a better accuracy than CNN models. A
possible reason is that RNN has an internal state (memory),
which can also take the correlation between the different
feature positions into consideration. In the training stage, this
internal state will make RNN be able to keep the highly
potential related in a long-term and finally keeps the most
corresponding feature positions. However, CNN considers
every different feature position individually in training. In
terms of RNN models, GRU and bidirectional GRU achieve
a similar accuracy (96.75% vs. 96.78%), which is better than
other RNN models’ accuracy. They also have a better recall
than precision (96.78% vs. 96.72% for GRU and 97.00% vs.
96.57% for Bidirectional GRU).
To face the high latency during feature preparation, we find
extracting API calls and manifest properties from unzipped
Dalvik binary and binary manifest file will cost less than 1
second. To validate the effect of our newly supplemented
features, we find the RNNs have an improvement at over
1% on the accuracy, and the accuracy of CNN increased
by 5%. Meanwhile, by comparing the result on different
feature categories and deep neural networks, we find that
(1) two feature types combined input has a much better
result than single feature type; (2) on average, the RNN
models have a better result than CNN. GRU models have
a better accuracy than the LSTM models on our dataset.
C. Effectiveness Evaluation of MobiTive on Mobile Devices
In this section, we evaluate (1) the performance of feature
preparation on six real devices with six different app sizes
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from 5MB to 50MB; (2) the effectiveness of MobiTive on
real Mobile devices.
1) Performance of feature preparation on real devices:
We evaluate the performance of feature preparation on six
real mobile devices. The time of feature preparation includes
unzipping time and feature extraction time. Due to the random-
ness of our test set, the size of test apps may not be able to give
a practical average score for feature unzipping and extraction.
Therefore, we measure the feature preparation with a newly-
constructed test data, which is built by selecting 10 apps from
each sampling size randomly. There are 600 samples in total
to evaluate the time cost of feature preparation.
Unzipping time comparison on real devices. Fig. 4 shows
the average unzipping time of 50MB apps on common speci-
fication devices (Huawei Mate 10, HTC U11, Nexus 6P, and
LG G6) locates between 1.023 and 2.586 seconds. For 5MB
apps, it locates between 0.119 and 0.264 seconds. For the
performance of low-profile device (Samsung Galaxy J7 Pro),
the unzipping time of 5MB and 50MB apps are 0.261 and
3.918 seconds. Considering flagship device (Huawei P30), they
are limited to less than 0.6 second. For 5MB apps, it only takes
0.046.
Feature extraction time comparison on real devices. Apart
from the performance evaluation of unzipping time, we further
evaluate the feature extraction time. To extract the API calls,
we package our API call parser used on the server side
into a jar with the help of JitPack. The API call parser is
used to extract API calls from binary code. Since the XML
decoder (axmldec) used on sever is implemented in C++,
we apply AXML as a lib to extract the manifest properties,
which is more suitable on the mobile side. Fig. 5 shows the
average feature extraction time of 50MB apps on common
specification devices locates between 2.089 and 6.216 seconds.
For 5MB apps, it locates between 0.146 and 0.22 seconds. On
low-profile device (Samsung Galaxy J7 Pro), the extraction
time of 5MB and 50MB apps are 0.516 and 5.452 seconds.
Considering flagship device (Huawei P30), they are limited
to less than 0.49 second. For 5MB apps, it only takes 0.092
second, which is very fast in practice.
2) Performance of RNN models on real device: Besides
analyzing the performance of preparing different types of raw
data and extracting features, we further provide a comparison
Fig. 5. Extraction time on different mobile devices
Fig. 6. The accuracy and prediction time of RNN models on Huawei P30
between the simple RNN model, stacked RNN model, and
bidirectiontal RNN model to provide an insight for both the
prediction accuracy (§ IV-B4) and performance on real device
(e.g., Huawei P30). As shown in Fig. 6, by comparing the
prediction time of different RNN models, which presented in
the histogram, we can see that the pre-trained model with GRU
has the best performance than any others. Meanwhile, from
the grey accuracy line in this figure, we can see it has the
second highest accuracy among them, which only has a small
difference comparing to the accuracy of bidirectional GRU
(96.75% vs. 96.78%). Considering all situations, we select
GRU model to evaluate the performance and accuracy of our
approach on the real mobile devices.
3) Accuracy and prediction time on different real devices:
To evaluate the effectiveness of MobiTive on real Android
mobile devices, we conduct a comparison experiment on test
accuracy and the prediction time on the six different real
devices. Note that, the used testing data on mobile devices
is same to the server side, including 1,800 malware and 1,800
benign samples respectively.
We record the average prediction time and detection accu-
racy by testing our quantized and non-quantized pre-trained
GRU models, and present in Table IX. By comparing the
accuracy of non-quantized and quantized models, we find that
the accuracy of quantized model will almost equal to the non-
quantized model for RNN (GRU). However, by comparing
the prediction time of them, it shows that the performance
of predicting with quantized model is a little better than
non-quantized model. In this experiment, the result shows
that the difference of prediction time, which brought by the
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TABLE IX
ACCURACY AND PERFORMANCE OF MOBITIVE ON REAL MOBILE DEVICES
Devices ReleasedYear
Unzipping
Time (s)
Extraction
Time (s) Quantized Accuracy
Prediction
Time (ms)
Total
Time (s)
Nexus 6P Sep 2015 0.97 0.73 No 96.75% 1.14 1.70Yes 96.75% 1.14 1.70
LG G6 Apr 2017 1.03 1.27 No 96.75% 0.74 2.30Yes 96.75% 0.73 2.30
Samsung Galaxy J7 Pro Jun 2017 1.51 2.45 No 96.75% 1.67 3.96Yes 96.75% 1.66 3.96
HTC U11 Jun 2017 0.54 1.22 No 96.75% 1.10 1.76Yes 96.75% 1.10 1.76
Huawei Mate 10 Feb 2018 0.44 1.74 No 96.75% 1.10 2.18Yes 96.75% 1.09 2.18
Huawei P30 Mar 2019 0.23 0.23 No 96.75% 0.56 0.46Yes 96.75% 0.55 0.46
quantization technique, is less than 0.01 microseconds. As
a result of the current inadequate support for the operators
in Tensorflow Lite, the structure of current applied deep
neural networks are relatively simple. However, with a more
complicated neural network, the quantization technique will
definitely provide a performance boost during the prediction
phase [46].
By calculating the unzipping, analyzing, and prediction time
together, the time is always acceptable for mobile users (i.e.,
less than 3 seconds on average, less than 1 second in best prac-
tice). By comparing the specifications of these devices used
in our experiment with the summarized devices’ specifications
(details on our website [24]), we find that the performance
benchmark result of most newly released devices are better
than the common devices selected in our experiments. Thus,
we can claim that the current mobile phones can support our
off-line prediction system smoothly.
Composition of overall time analysis. Comparing the feature
preparation and prediction time in common cases in Table IX.
we can see that the detection time only cost less than 1%
among the total time on common spec devices. Thus, reducing
the time cost in feature preparation will bring a considerable
performance improvement for our detection system. It is also
a strong motivation for us. Additionally, as a result of the
installation mechanism, the downloaded Android APK will
be always unzipped by the Android operation system. Thus,
there will be a same step between our approach and the
installing procedures, which is extracting the same raw data
from the target APK. If we can deploy our approach on the
Android operation system framework directly, the time cost
of unzipping step in our approach will be saved. It is a new
research point of this field in the future.
To determine the feature preparation and prediction perfor-
mance on real devices, we find (1) the feature preparation
time is less than 4 seconds on average; (2) the prediction
time of RNN models is less than 2ms on average. GRU
costs 0.44ms with the best performance. Meanwhile, by
comparing the result on six mobile devices, we find Mo-
biTive costs (1) less than 3 seconds on common devices,
(2) less than 0.5 second on flagship device.
D. Analysis of Hardware Performance Evolution Trend of
Android Mobile Devices
In this section, we conduct a study from three different
aspects to investigate the hardware performance evolution
trend of Android mobile devices.
To provide insights into the current and future usability of
MobiTive, we study 45 widely-used chipsets, which released
between 2016 and 2019. They are collected from three well-
known brands, Exynos, Kirin, and Snapdragon We select
4–5 chipsets from each brand and compare them with 3
different kinds of benchmark test scores (i.e., Greekbench 4.4
64 Bit Single-Core score, Greekbench 4.4 64 Bit Multi-Core
score, and Octane V2 total score). As shown in Fig 7, we
present the results along time line to reveal the fast evolution
trend of the chipsets. From the polylines, which refer to the
different score results, we can see that the performance of the
chipsets has doubled during the past 5 years. We detail the
full specifications of chipsets on our website [24]. Besides the
analysis of chipsets, we also investigate the clock freqency and
RAM size on 167 Android mobile devices, which is released
in 2019, and present them on our website [24]. As shown in
Fig. 8, we can see that the current frequency of new released
Android devices are mostly located in 2000∼2500MHz and
2500∼3000MHz, which refers to common devices and flag-
ship devices respectively. As shown in Fig. 9, we can see that
the current RAM sizes of new released Android devices are
mostly larger than 3GB. The mainstream RAM sizes are 4GB,
6GB, and 8GB, which have a proportion around 72% among
the whole specification data. By investigating the hardware
performance evaluation results of real devices on chipsets and
RAM with the six devices used in our experiments, we can tell
that the most of the current Android mobile phones can support
MobiTive smoothly and achieve a responsive detection.
By collecting and analyzing the specifications of chipsets
and devices, we find the evolution trend of chipsets will
provide a better performance for MobiTive in the future.
Meanwhile, the study on device specifications released in
2019 shows that most new devices will have a performance
not worse than our 4 selected common devices.
V. LIMITATIONS
In this section, we discuss the limitations of MobiTive.
Feature selection. As a result of the performance requirement
of MobiTive, the limited selected feature categories (i.e.,
manifest properties and API calls) surely will not cause large
overhead when it is working on an Android device. However,
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Fig. 7. Benchmark score comparison among different chipsets from Exynos,
Kirin, and Snapdragon
Fig. 8. Top 21 chipsets assembled in Android mobile phones released in 2019
the limited two feature types will also provide limited informa-
tion from the Android malware. If there will be a new malware
family, whose malicious behaviors can not be represented by
our selected feature types, the MobiTive may not be able to
detect them. In the future, we aim to add more effective feature
types with low-performance costs as well.
New malware family detection. Due to the limited training
dataset, MobiTive has a similar limitation as other learning-
based malware detection systems, which is different from the
traditional control/data flow analysis approaches. Considering
a new malware family detected, the situation may be that
only few malware in this family are confirmed in a period.
Consequently, there are not many new malware can be used
as part of the training dataset. If the proportion of this new
family is quite limited in training dataset, there may have an
uncertain training result, which makes MobiTive difficult to be
applied as the first-order protection to against the new detected
malware family. However, this is an open question. in this
paper, we use different malware families as much as possible
to conduct our training dataset.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we will summarize the current work about
Android malware detection and discuss the difference between
them and MobiTive.
Some techniques are proposed based on analyzing the XML
files from the APK file. C.-Y. Huang et al. [47] classified the
Fig. 9. RAM size of Android mobile devices released in 2019
benign data and malware data using the permission informa-
tion in manifest and files structure as features. Similarly, Z.
Aung et al. [48] also considered the permission. Differently,
they concentrate on the permission requires in the source code,
not only the static permission information in the manifest file.
E. Chin et al. [49] proposed ComDroid, which detects malware
by analyzing the manifest file. There are also some techniques
which are based on the API [50]. L. Deshotels [51] et al.
classified the benign apps and malware based on the frequency
of API calls. M. Zhang et al. [52] developed a classifier,
DroidSIFT, which is based on the API dependency graphs. Y.
Zhongyang et al. [53] introduced DroidAlarm, which analyzes
the inter-procedural call graphs constructed by the relationship
between permissions and the interface to identify attacks. L. K.
Yan et al. [6] proposed DroidScope, which generates semantic
information from API call traces and Dalvik opcode traces.
D.-J. Wu et al. [54] proposed the technique, DroidMat, to
detect malware with API traces, intent, communication and
some other the life-cycle information.
Another line of malware research is conducted based on
the program analysis (e.g., control flow graph), which is
more expensive than the XML-based and API-based approach.
However, the result tends to be more precise. Narayanan et
al. [30] presented an online SVM classifier, which uses the
control flow graph generated from the source code as input. W.
Enck et al. [55] proposed TaintDroid, which is a taint analysis
tool for Android apps. It detects the leakages with the data
flow analysis on target sensitive data. G. Z. Meng et al. [56]
proposed a deterministic symbolic automaton (DSA) based
detection system, in which DSA contains the corresponding
components of the target app. Furthermore, they developed
a system, DroidEcho, which detects attacks with the inter-
component communication graphs (ICCG). ICCG provides
both the call graphs and sensitive data flow in apps.
Machine learning has achieved great success in malware
detection, there exist also a lot of learning-based approaches.
D. Arp et al. [13] proposed Drebin, which is a classifier using
features from both of XML files and API calls. Z. Yuan [20] et
al. provided Droid-detector, which performs on a deep belief
network. W. Yu [18] et al. presented a malware detection
system, which uses permission and API call traces as input. N.
McLaughlin [31] et al. used the convolution neural network
in detection. The raw opcode sequences of target apps are
used as the input feature. Kim [57] et al. presented a malware
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detection framework based on multiple neural networks. Every
network has a single feature input and output score. The final
detection result is a combination of all the models. K. Xu
[58] et al. proposed DeepRefiner, which is an efficient two
layer malware detection system. They involved XML features
as the first layer to perform a fast detection first. At the end
of the first layer, if it cannot promise the result with a high
rate, it will use some more complicated features, like bytecode
information, etc., in the second layer to determine whether the
target is a malware.
In addition, there are still some other techniques. A. Demon-
tis et al. [59] proposed an algorithm to mitigates attacks like
malware data manipulation. T. Blsing et al. [60] introduced
AASandbox, which performs detection with combination in-
formation of both static and dynamic analysis. A. Shabtai
et al. [61] and A.-D. Schmidt et al. [62] provided the ab-
normalities identification systems, which use run-time device
information, such as CPU usage etc. J. Sun et al. [63] trained
a machine learning based classifier, which use the distance of
keywords to detect the malware. L. Lu et al. [64], P. P. F. Chan
et al. [65], K. Lu et al. [66] and F. Wei et al. [67] focused
on detecting vulnerable components, which may hijack the
apps. W. Zhou et al. [68] provided a malware detection
system, DroidModss, which uses hash comparison to detect
repacked Apks. M. Grace et al. [69] proposed RiskRanker,
which performs detection via analyzing specific app behaviors.
Existing techniques mainly focused on detecting malware on
the server side based on the information from the APK file and
the source code. However, with the rapid development of AI
chips on mobile devices, the research about malware detection
on the mobile side is still rare and on demand. Different from
the existing techniques, this paper performs the research on the
malware detection using deep learning algorithms according to
various performance-based experiments on the Android mobile
devices.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents MobiTive, a performance-sensitive An-
droid malware detection system on mobile devices as a pre-
installed solution. According to the effectiveness of selected
features and the efficiency of feature extraction, MobiTive can
provide a reliable detection accuracy and fast responsive (i.e.,
less than 3 seconds on average) detection service on mobile
devices directly. To validate the efficiency and reliability, we
evaluate MobiTive on six real mobile devices. To provide more
insights of this work, we also make an in-depth analysis of
the performance trend on over one hundred Android mobile
phones.
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